

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
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PUBLIC AFFAIRS: A FACET OF OPERATIONAL ART?

by

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
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The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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ABSTRACT

Undeniably, the relationship between the United States (U.S.) military and the news media is of vital interest to the operational commander. If the news media is not satisfied with the commander's effort to provide access to military operations, unnecessary difficulties for the commander and adverse press for the military are inevitable. Military-media experiences during Operations Urgent Fury in Grenada and Just Cause in Panama suffered from poor public affairs (PA) planning. Commanders of Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti learned from the mistakes of Grenada and Panama, and implemented a successful PA plan. Lessons from these three operations significantly influenced the formulation of current Department of Defense instructions and Joint Chiefs of Staff publications that detail PA, including media relations guidance. Operational commanders must embrace this guidance and integrate PA planning with operational planning processes throughout the range of military operations. Furthermore, the education and training of all operational staff members about PA enhances the likelihood of beneficial military-media relations. Clearly, with the proven significance the media plays in planning and executing military operations, and with the influence the media has on U.S. public opinion, commanders should consider public affairs a facet of operational art.

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THESIS

Incidents during Operations Urgent Fury in Grenada and Just Cause in Panama

proved the relationship between the United States (U.S.) military and the news media is of vital interest to the operational commander. Commanders who implement public affairs (PA) planning and execution policies that are integrated with operational planning processes, throughout the range of military operations, enhance the likelihood of beneficial military-media relations. Additionally, commanders must realize the effect their PA policies have on public opinion. The media's influence on military operations and public opinion forces operational commanders to consider public affairs a facet of *operational art*.

MEDIA EXCLUSION

When the U.S. invaded Grenada in 1983, military-media relations were poor. Many senior officers who served in Vietnam, and their subordinate protégés, harbored resentment toward the media. They believed "that the United States lost the war because negative media coverage turned the American people against the conflict."¹ During the ten years preceding the Grenada invasion, there was endless finger pointing between military and media personnel regarding the reasons for failure in Vietnam. A product of this mutual aversion was that officers "felt they had more to lose than gain by interacting with the press. While the DoD [Department of Defense] and JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff] directives required new

¹ Jacqueline E. Sharkey, Under Fire: U.S. Military Restrictions on the Media from Grenada to the Persian Gulf (Washington: The Center for Public Integrity, 1991), 4.

media planning for military operations, commanders did not understand this to be an integral part of the overall planning.”²

In planning for Operation Urgent Fury, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger allowed the JCS and ultimately the Commander, Joint Task Force (CJTF), Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf III, to determine the degree of access given to the press. VADM Metcalf planned to completely exclude the media from covering the invasion until he thought the media could do no harm.³ As word of the impending invasion leaked, over 600 journalists descended on Barbados, and expected the military to provide transportation to Grenada and admittance to the battleground. However, VADM Metcalf purposefully prevented the media from accessing the island for two days. Military aircraft turned away resourceful reporters who attempted to fly in themselves. Additionally, on the second day of the invasion U.S. military troops captured a group of journalists who rented a yacht and sailed to Grenada. The military sequestered them on the USS GUAM and initially prevented the reporters from communicating with their newspapers. After VADM Metcalf lifted the media ban, officers escorted members of the press and often prevented access to areas deemed unsatisfactory by the military. VADM Metcalf later wrote of the media: “There were other priorities to be dealt with.... They had to make the best of the situation.”⁴

The strategy of media exclusion employed by VADM Metcalf was similar to that of the British Military during the 1982 Falklands War where the British government strictly

² Frank Aukofer and William P. Lawrence, America's Team: The Odd Couple (Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University. The Freedom Forum First Amendment Center, 1995), 44.

³ Bernard E. Trainor, Military Perspectives on Humanitarian Intervention and Military-Media Relations (Berkeley: University of California. Regents of the University of California, 1995), 38.

⁴ Joseph Metcalf III, “Decision Making and the Grenada Rescue Operation,” in Ambiguity and Command: Organizational Perspectives on Military Decision Making by James G. March and Roger Weissinger-Baylon (Marshfield, MA: Pitman, 1986), 290.

controlled the media. Several authors believe VADM Metcalf derived his PA policy from an article in the Naval War College Review that detailed British PA policies throughout the War in the South Atlantic.⁵ Conclusions developed in the article by Lieutenant Commander Humphries included:

If you don't want to erode the public's confidence in the government's war aims, then you cannot allow that public's sons to be wounded or maimed right in front of them via their TV sets at home;

You must, therefore, control correspondents' access to the fighting;

You must invoke censorship in order to halt aid to both the known and the suspected enemies....⁶

Following the invasion, the media registered strong protests over the treatment they received from the military. Accusations of controlling the agenda of reporters, denying access to combat areas, and harassing and detaining press personnel working outside the military's media operation reached the Pentagon.⁷ Some high-level military officers and members of Congress found the restrictions placed on the media during Urgent Fury alarming. Responding to the criticism, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) General John W. Vessey Jr. asked retired Vietnam War military spokesman Major General Winant Sidle to convene a panel of experts to re-evaluate the military-media relationship.

The Sidle Panel reviewed the problems encountered during Urgent Fury, but did not address specific issues. Instead, the panel looked to improving future military-media relations. In August 1984, the panel released its report. It contained eight major recommendations, the most significant being the formation of a "pool system" of reporting. This resulted in the establishment of the Department of Defense National Media Pool

⁵ William V. Kennedy II, The Military and the Media: Why the Press Cannot Be Trusted to Cover a War (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993), 114; Sharkey, 4.

⁶ Arthur A. Humphries, "Two Routes to the Wrong Destination: Public Affairs in the South Atlantic War," Naval War College Review, May-June 1983, 70.

⁷ Sharkey, 7.

(DNMP)—a select group of representative media that will be present at the beginning of military operations until regular media arrives. Other recommendations were that military commanders should conduct PA planning concurrently with operational planning, that sufficient transportation and communications equipment be provided for the media, and that qualified military personnel be specifically assigned to assist journalists.⁸ If implemented, each of the Panels recommendations significantly affect the operational commander and his staff's planning processes.

Between Operations Urgent Fury and Just Cause, military-media relations did not improve as hoped for by the Sidle Panel; in fact, tensions increased. Following charges from the press about the treatment they received in Grenada, many officers became more weary of the media. Richard Halloran in “Soldiers and Scribblers: A Common Mission” faulted both the military and the press for the distrust. He wrote:

[I]t would seem that the vast majority of military officers have vague impressions, emotional reactions, and gut feelings about the press and television but are, in fact, operating in ignorance.... [W]e in the press do a miserable job of explaining ourselves. As large segments of American society—military officers are far from alone in this—have recently questioned the ethics, motives, accuracy, fairness, and responsibility of the press and television, editors and reporters belatedly have come to realize that their institutions are in trouble. Even so, we have been slow to respond and are still, in this correspondent's view, well behind the curve.⁹

Clearly, the military-media relationship needed help.

⁸ Ibid., 16-17.

⁹ Richard Halloran, “Soldiers and Scribblers: A Common Mission,” in Newsmen and National Defense: Is Conflict Inevitable? ed. Lloyd J. Matthews (McLean, VA: Brassey's (US) Inc., 1991), 40.

THE POOL

From 1984, through, 1987 the DoD employed the DNMP for training purposes—military and media—during major military exercises. The first use in actual military operations occurred in 1987 to cover U.S. Navy actions in the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq War. The pool concept received mixed reviews.¹⁰ Nevertheless, the DoD retained the pool, which would soon have a real test in Panama.

During strategic planning for Just Cause, President George Bush, on more than one occasion, made it clear to Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney that he was concerned about operational security (OPSEC) and leaks from the media. On 17 December, Secretary Cheney informed the President he intended to activate the Washington based DNMP. After reiterating his concern for secrecy, the President accepted the recommendation on 19 December—approximately ten hours before the operation began.¹¹

Colonel Ron Sconyers, the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) Public Affairs Officer, was formally told of the invasion plans on 17 December. For OPSEC reasons he could not inform his staff until 19 December. At 1700 on 19 December, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (ASD PA) Pete Williams informed Col Sconyers that the DNMP would arrive in Panama at 0330 on 20 December. Mr. Williams prevented Col Sconyers from informing his staff of the pool's arrival until 2200 on 19 December.¹² This gave the SOUTHCOM PAO and his staff less than six hours to plan. Col Sconyers hastily made arrangements and an itinerary for the sixteen member pool. The DNMP eventually

¹⁰ Sharkey, 18.

¹¹ Fred S. Hoffman, "The Panama Press Pool Deployment: A Critique," in Newsmen and National Defense: Is Conflict Inevitable? ed. Lloyd J. Matthews (McLean, VA: Brassey's (US) Inc., 1991), 96.

¹² Jane E. Crichton, The Department of Defense Press Pool: Did It Work in Panama? (Phoenix, AZ: University of Arizona. Department of Journalism, 1990), 32.

arrived at Howard Air Force Base in Panama at 0500 on 20 December—four hours after U.S. troops began their attacks.¹³ The pool's late arrival, combined with transportation difficulties, communications problems at the SOUTHCOM media center, and the military's concerns for journalist's safety essentially prevented the DNMP from providing any substantive news for the first thirty-six hours of Operation Just Cause.¹⁴

Following the initial difficulties and the backlash from the media, Pentagon and White House officials sought to remedy the situation by sending an additional 300 journalists to Panama on 21 and 22 December. This only added to Col Sconyers' difficulties. The additional "swarm" of reporters overwhelmed an already ill-prepared SOUTHCOM PA Staff. These reporters did not leave Howard Air Force Base until 23 December for their first real media opportunity.¹⁵

In the first major operation involving combat since Grenada, military-media relations were again poor. Flaws in the DNMP system and in the military PA planning process provided nearly as much press as the invasion of Panama itself. What were the most significant problems that could have been averted? First, excessive concerns for OPSEC by the DoD and the White House prevented the SOUTHCOM PA Staff from having sufficient lead time to adequately plan for the DNMP arrival.¹⁶ Second, Pentagon PA Staff and ASD PA Williams ignored Col Sconyers' recommendations in mid-November to use the numerous American journalists already in Panama, in lieu of activating the DNMP. Mr. Williams explained the DoD's action: "We felt we had an obligation to do it. Though there were

¹³ Pascale M. Combelles, "Operation Just Cause: A Military-Media Fiasco," Military Review, May-June 1995, 77.

¹⁴ Ibid.; Hoffman, 92.

¹⁵ Combelles, 84.

¹⁶ Hoffman, 98.

already reporters in Panama, the feeling was that we had a DoD media pool just for that sort of operation and it should be used.”¹⁷ Many media personnel believe Col Sconyers was correct; Panama was not the proper type of operation to employ the pool. The DoD designed the DNMP to cover military operations in remote areas until normal press arrived on scene, not in an area that had nearly thirty reporters covering the situation for weeks.¹⁸ The third problem was that poor planning by Pentagon and SOUTHCOM PA Staffs prevented the press from covering significant action. Had they integrated PA planning into operational plans, most of the media difficulties in Panama would not have occurred. General Max Thurman, SOUTHCOM Commander in Chief (CINC), admitted: “I think we made a mistake by not having some of the press pool in with the 18th Airborne Corps so they could move with the troops.”¹⁹

Following Just Cause, prominent media personnel and press executives met with ASD PA Williams to discuss pool operations. Journalist Fred Hoffman offered seventeen recommendations to the DoD for pool improvement that focused on the PA planning process.²⁰ On 18 May 1990, after the JCS received Hoffman’s recommendations, they issued “DoD National Media Pool Planning Requirements” that required regional CINCs to plan for PA simultaneously with operational planning. This message made it clear to operational commanders that the press will be on the battlefield from the outset of hostilities.²¹ The challenge facing commanders was to integrate the press into plans without sacrificing operational effectiveness.

¹⁷ Pete Williams, quoted in Combelles, 79.

¹⁸ Combelles, 79; Hoffman, 92.

¹⁹ Max Thurman, quoted in Hoffman, 94.

²⁰ Combelles, 84.

²¹ Aukofer and Lawrence, 45.

PROCESS IMPROVEMENT

When Operation Uphold Democracy began in September 1994, the cooperation between military commanders and the media was unprecedented.²² Lieutenant General H. Hugh Shelton, CJTF for the Operation, wrote:

In this operation, the media were assigned to units spearheading the planned invasion. This way, reporters, and thus, the American people, would see how their Armed Forces performed in action.... While Operations in Haiti may not be the new paradigm for the media-military relationships it certainly improved it.²³

Obviously, LtGen Shelton learned from past commanders' mistakes and integrated detailed PA planning into his operational plans. His personal involvement in media relations gave the correct signal to all subordinate commanders about the significance of PA planning and implementation. Although the combat phase was never executed, the media praised LtGen Shelton for his inclusion of journalists in all plans, and for allowing media on the command and control ship, USS MOUNT WHITNEY.²⁴ Since the media had prior knowledge of nearly all elements of the Operation, LtGen Shelton worried about OPSEC. In an article for Military Review he wrote: "Reporters understood the ground rules and knew that a story released ahead of time could endanger US forces."²⁵ Both the press and the military adhered to the "DoD Principles for News Media Coverage of DoD Operations", a joint military-media document developed by major news media representatives and Pentagon officials following Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. These prevalent principles highlight PA procedures and reiterate commanders' responsibilities in taking personal involvement throughout the PA planning and activation process.

²² Ibid.

²³ H. Hugh Shelton and Timothy D. Vane, "Winning the Information War in Haiti," Military Review, November-December 1995, 3.

²⁴ Aukofer and Lawrence, 64-65.

²⁵ Shelton and Vane, 9.

In Haiti, the activation of the DNMP also went smoothly. Instead of “herding” the entire pool around from media event to media event, PAOs assigned individual members to specific tactical units. Also, PA planning accounted for non-DNMP members. These journalists received the same media opportunities as pool members, so long as they abided by the DNMP rules. There were no difficulties.²⁶

The benefits of integrated PA planning are clear. Proper PA staff work and individual attention from the operational commander made media relations during Operation Uphold Democracy an unqualified success.

GUIDANCE FOR COMMANDERS

The DoD and JCS developed directives, instructions, manuals, and publications (“documents” for brevity’s sake) that provide guidance to the operational commander and his staff for all aspects of PA planning. The majority of the pertinent documents are relatively new or recently updated. This infers that the DoD and JCS incorporated “lessons learned” from past military-media encounters into these documents. Analysis proves this assumption correct. These documents mandate PA planning and require favorable media relations policies to prevent commanders from committing mistakes similar to those in Operations Urgent Fury and Just Cause.

The most useful document for the operational commander is DoD Instruction 5400.14, Procedures for Joint Public Affairs Operations. This definitive instruction furnishes CINCs and their staffs with responsibilities, procedures, and a complete description of PA planning requirements including: operation plans (OPLAN), deployment plans, DNMP

²⁶ Aukofer and Lawrence, 64.

utilization, and references to more specific guidance. Additionally, this Instruction includes as enclosures the “Principles of Information” and the previously discussed “DoD Principles for News Media Coverage of DoD Operations”. The “Principles of Information” are policy statements that require commanders “to make available timely and accurate information so that the public, Congress, and the news media may assess and understand the facts about national security and defense strategy....”²⁷

A number of documents contain JCS guidance for PA. The Universal Joint Task List Version 3.0 (CJCSM 3500.04A) specifies PA tasks, in a hierarchical listing, that can be performed by a joint military force.²⁸ Joint Pub 5-03.2, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Volume II, contains PA guidance for the development of OPLANs, CINC responsibilities in PA matters during the deliberate and crisis action planning process, and a format for annex “F” of OPLANs. Joint Pub 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), contains a concise, but effective discussion of the importance of PA in MOOTW. Joint Pub 3-07 also refers to Joint Pub 1-07, Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations, to obtain further PA guidance, but at this time Joint Pub 1-07 is only in draft form.²⁹ There is surprisingly little discussion of PA or media relations in some of the more significant Joint Pubs. Joint Pub 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations, does not mention PA planning. A suitable place to consider the requirements for PA planning is in the “Campaign Planning” section. As a minimum, a statement in the “Fundamentals of

²⁷ U.S. Department of Defense, Procedures for Joint Public Affairs Operations, DODINST 5400.14 (Washington: 1996), 9.

²⁸ Specific operational level PA tasks in the Universal Joint Task List are located in the “OP5 Exercise Operational Command and Control” section pp 2-129,130.

²⁹ I obtained a copy of the Joint Pub 1-07 draft, but was directed to not use it as a reference for this research.

Campaign Plans" could read: "Implement a public affairs plan that provides open and independent reporting, and keeps the American public informed of its military operations while maintaining force protection through operational security awareness."³⁰ The only remarks about PA or media relations in Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, are brief discussions in the "MOOTW" and "Multinational Operations" chapters. This Pub should address PA in the "Planning Joint Operations" chapter.

Poor PA planning and procedures during Urgent Fury and Just Cause precipitated tremendous difficulty for operational commanders and the military, yet significant JCS publications detailing joint operations planning fail to address PA or media relations. Hopefully, when Joint Pub 1-07 is finally issued, it will stress the requirements for conducting integrated PA planning across the full range of military operations, and will explain and mandate use of the DoD "Principles of Information".

COMMANDERS' RESPONSIBILITIES

The majority of the instructions and publications discussed earlier only address PA matters during actual joint operations or major military exercises. These works fail to adequately cover education and training. Without proper staff education and training, PA objectives are likely to fail. An analogy, albeit extreme, is to send fighter pilots into a new combat situation without any ground school or training flights since their last combat missions. Operational commanders must ensure that they, their staffs, and their subordinate

³⁰ Statement is a summary of PA guidance provided in U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, Joint Pub 3-07 (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1995), IV-6.

commanders receive proper instruction so that PA skills are available when needed.

As a minimum, commanders should stress to staff personnel and subordinate commanders that PAOs cannot do it all; in effect, every soldier, sailor, and Marine must be ready to contribute to the PA mission. Journalists do not always want to interview commanders or spokespersons; they often desire to go directly to the source. Moreover, during a crisis, there are too few PA staff members to accommodate all the media. Therefore, training for unexpected media encounters, planned interviews, and media logistics is necessary for commanders and subordinates.³¹ In Meeting the Press: A Media Survival Guide for the Defense Manager, Judson Conner provides “The Commandments”, ten basic rules to follow during a media encounter. Conner also presents checklists for general use, interviews, hostile press encounters, press conferences, and television.³² “The Commandments” and checklists are excellent guides for developing interview skills.

Several sources cite that military officers should understand the entire spectrum of media operations—not only the print and broadcast mediums, but the subsets within them.³³ Consequently, commanders should require PAOs to cultivate a continuous media education process within their staffs. This will help staffs tailor PA planning for specific media requirements; and help establish solid, professional associations between the military and journalists.

Along with the education and training of staffs, commanders must foster healthy relationships between themselves, PAOs, and the remainder of the staff. Thoroughly

³¹ Shelton and Vane, 7.

³² Judson Conner, Meeting the Press: A Media Survival Guide for the Defense Manager (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1993), 81-87.

³³ Aukofer and Lawrence, 82; Richard Halloran, “Soldiers and Scribblers Revisited: Working with the Media,” in Newsmen and National Defense: Is Conflict Inevitable?, 135.

integrated and competent PA planning is not possible if the commander and his staff do not respect the PAO's mission. Richard Halloran in "Soldiers and Scribblers Revisited: Working with the Media" observed:

A commander with an open attitude communicates that tone to his subordinates and enables the PAO to do his job.... The commander should demand the assignment of a competent PAO and listen to him as with any other staff officer. Equally important, when things go wrong, and they will, the commander must protect him...just as he would protect another staff officer.³⁴

With the DoD mandate that journalists will be on the battlefield from the onset of hostilities, operational commanders must prepare themselves and their staffs for media encounters. Education and training in PA, and a proper command atmosphere contribute to ensuring that future military-media relations are positive. Thereby, commanders help to ensure the American public receives "timely and accurate information on the conduct of military operations".³⁵

A FACET OF OPERATIONAL ART?

*Military operations can no longer be defined only in terms of fire and maneuver. The U.S. commander must understand how to deal with the media and the important implications of media coverage.*³⁶

*-LtGen Anthony C. Zinni and
Col Frederick M. Lorenz*

By the time senior officers are fortunate enough to command at the operational level, their mastery of tactics is assumed and in many instances proven. In addition to being expert tacticians, it is incumbent on operational commanders to have a keen understanding of the JCS national military strategy. Consequently, operational commanders must use their tactical prowess, grasp of the national military strategy, and professional military education "to link

³⁴ Halloran, "Soldiers and Scribblers Revisited," 140.

³⁵ U.S. Army Dept., Operations, FM 100-5 (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1993), 1-3.

³⁶ Frederick M. Lorenz and Anthony C. Zinni, "Media Relations: A Commander's Perspective," Marine Corps Gazette, December 1995, 67.

the tactical employment of forces to strategic objectives.”³⁷ An understanding of the intricacies of *operational art* is paramount to commanders’ achieving these strategic objectives.

Professor Milan Vego, currently teaching at the Naval War College wrote: “Operational art is applied across the entire range of military operations.... It bridges the gap between strategy and tactics by translating national or alliance (coalition) objectives.”³⁸ Joint Pub 3-0 defines *operational art*, as “the employment of military forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles.”³⁹ Joint Pub 3-0 also provides an analysis of the fundamental elements or facets of *operational art*. As previously discussed, it does not address the significant role PA plays in joint operations. Moreover, there is no discussion of PA in Joint Pub 3-0’s development of the facets of *operational art*.

Operational commanders’ PA policies affect several facets of *operational art*. An embracing PA policy that welcomes the media enables commanders to broadcast to the world dramatic print and visual representations of U.S. military might. As the American public receives positive comments about its armed forces, public opinion—often a U.S. strategic *center of gravity*—improves. By increasing the commanders *operational reach*, through global broadcast coverage, the international media helps to indirectly attack the enemy’s strategic *center of gravity*—frequently public opinion or a specific leader’s opinion. Media coverage of troop deployments and ship movements assists the commander in obtaining

³⁷ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Operations, Joint Pub 3-0 (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1995), II-2.

³⁸ Milan Vego, “Operational Art,” Unpublished Paper, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI: 1996, 4.

³⁹ Joint Pub 3-0, GL-10.

leverage by essentially being a “combat multiplier”.⁴⁰ The impact of PA on *operational art* is clear.

Further development of the significance PA has on *operational art* requires additional analysis of public opinion. Carl Von Clausewitz in On War developed the concept of war as “a paradoxical trinity.... The first of these three aspects mainly concerns the people; the second the commander and his army; the third the government.”⁴¹ In Clausewitz’s trinitarian linkage, he tasks the military, the people, and the government “to develop a theory that maintains a balance between these three...like an object suspended between three magnets.”⁴² Throughout the range of military operations, the media provides the linkage between the military and the people, and in some respects between the military and the government. The Army’s FM 100-5 states the media “serves as a conduit of information.... Dramatic visual presentations can rapidly influence public—and therefore political—opinion so that the political underpinnings of war and operations other than war may suddenly change with no prior indication to the commander in the field.”⁴³ Consequently, the media, and its influence on public opinion, has a tremendous impact on maintaining Clausewitz’s “balance between these three....” Operational commanders fulfill Clausewitz’s task by implementing DoD and JCS PA guidance that allows the media to inform the “people”. Therefore, while not explicitly stated as a facet of *operational art*, PA certainly requires treatment as such.

⁴⁰ Richard M. Bridges, “The Military, the Media and the Next Conflict: Have We Learned Our Lesson?” Army, August 1995, <<http://www-cgsc.army.mil/cgsc/milrev/c10.web/html/apl.html>> (18 December 1996), 2.

⁴¹ Carl Von Clausewitz, On War ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 89.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ FM 100-5, 1-3.

CONCLUSIONS

Prior to Operation Uphold Democracy, commanders often failed to consider PA planning as an integral part of operational planning. Consequently, unfavorable military-media experiences during Operations Urgent Fury and Just Cause were sources of unnecessary difficulty for commanders, and precipitated the development of new PA guidance. The newly formed DoD and JCS PA guidance mandates that commanders: conduct operational planning and PA planning concurrently; grant access to the media early in the pre-deployment stages; and most significantly, take a personal and vested interest in the PA planning process.

Operational commanders can not assume that all future military operations will permit media coverage as open and independent as in Haiti. Subsequent conflicts requiring more security and surprise are probable. The DOD and JCS guidance take this into consideration. However, there are basic PA tenets for commanders to apply in all military operations:

- prevent significant, avoidable difficulties through competent PA planning;
- consider past successes and failures while conducting PA planning;
- use DOD and JCS guidance while conducting PA planning;
- realize that the media will be on the battlefield from start to finish;
- ensure staff and subordinate commanders are educated and trained in PA;
- understand the media's influence on public opinion.

Adherence to these tenets prevents incidents that distract U.S. military commanders from

their foremost responsibility, “to fight and win our Nation’s wars.”⁴⁴ Clearly, with the proven significance the media plays in planning and executing military operations, and with the influence the media has on U.S. public opinion, commanders should consider public affairs a facet of *operational art*.

⁴⁴ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy of the United States of America, (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1995), 2.

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